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The role of the observer in goal-directed behavior
Ine´s Samengo
Abstract
In goal-directed behavior, a large number of possible initial states end up in the pursued goal.
The accompanying information loss implies that goal-oriented behavior is in one-to-one corre-
spondence with an open subsystem whose entropy decreases in time. Yet ultimately, the laws of
physics are reversible, so entropy variations are necessarily a consequence of the way a system
is described. In order to reconcile different levels of description, systems capable of yielding
goal-directed behavior must transfer the information about initial conditions to other degrees of
freedom outside the boundaries of the agent. To operate steadily, they must consume ordered
degrees of freedom provided as input, and be dispensed of disordered outputs that act as wastes
from the point of view of the aimed objective. Broadly speaking, hence, goal-oriented behav-
ior requires metabolism, even if conducted by non-living agents. Here I argue that a physical
system may or may not display goal-directed behavior depending on what exactly is defined as
the agent. The borders of the agent must be carefully tailored so as to entail the appropriate
information balance sheet. In this game, observers play the role of tailors: They design agents
by setting the limits of the system of interest. Their computation may be iterated to produce a
hierarchy of ever more complex agents, aiming at increasingly sophisticated goals, as observed
in darwinian evolution. Brain-guided subjects perform this creative observation task naturally,
implying that the observation of goal-oriented behavior is a goal-oriented behavior in itself.
Minds evolved to cut out pieces of reality and endow them with intentionality, because ascrib-
ing intentionality is an efficient way of modeling the world, and making predictions. One most
remarkable agent of whom we have indisputable evidence of its goal-pursuing attitude is the
self. Notably, this agent is simultaneously the subject and the object of observation.
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A bunch of nucleic acids swim among many other organic compounds forming a cytoplas-
matic soup, and somehow, manage to arrange themselves into precisely the sequence required
for DNA replication. Carbon dioxide molecules steadily stick to one another materializing a
solid tree trunk out of a tiny seed. Owls eat the young bats with poor navigation ability, thereby
improving the eco-location proficiency of the species. The neurons in a dog’s brain fire pre-
cisely in the required sequence to have the dog bury its bone, hiding it from other dogs. The
wheels, breaks, and clutch of a self-driving car coordinate their actions in order to reach the
parking area of a soccer field, no matter the initial location of the car, nor the traffic along the
way. The limbs of the Argentine soccer players display a complex pattern of movements that
carry the ball, through kicks and headers, at Messi’s feet in front of the keeper... kick... goal!
This essay is about goals. In all the above examples, a collection of basic elements, follow-
ing local and apparently purpose-less laws, manage to steer the value of certain variables into
some desired regime. The initial state is rather arbitrary, and yet, the agents manage to adap-
tively select, out of many possible actions, the maneuvers that are suited to conduct the system
to the desired goal. Throughout these seemingly intelligent choices, order appears to raise from
disorder. Scattered nucleotides become DNA. Air and dust become trees. Owl hunger becomes
sophisticated eco-location organs. Neural activity becomes a buried bone. A car anywhere in
the city becomes a car at a specific location. A football anywhere in the stadium becomes a
football in the goal. How do the components of each system know what to do, and what not to
do, in order to reach the goal? This is the question that will entertain us here.
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Figure 1: In DNA replication, many initial
states are mapped onto a single final state. The
entropy is therefore high at the beginning and
low at the end.
One important characteristic of goal-
directed agents is that they are flexible: They
reach the goal from multiple initial condi-
tions, and are typically able to circumvent ob-
stacles. For example, in DNA replication, the
initial state is one out of many configurations
in which nucleotides can be spatially dis-
tributed in a solution of organic compounds.
The final state, the goal, is the precise spatial
arrangement of those same nucleotides within
the newly constructed DNA strand. In the
soccer stadium, the ball may be initially in
any location, the final state is the ball at the
goal. Multiple initial states are hence mapped
onto a single final state, as in Fig. 1. In physical terms, the non-injective nature of this mapping
implies a reduction in entropy.
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Admittedly, the final state need not be strictly unique. In DNA replication, permutations
of equal nucleotides are still allowed in the final state, and occasionally, there might also be
a few errors in the replication process. Dogs may consider more than a single location for the
concealed bounty, and Messi may choose to shoot the ball anywhere inside the 24 ft wide by 8 ft
high of the goal. Such restricted amounts of freedom, or even the occasional failures to reach the
final state (shooting an own goal, for example), by no means compensate the abrupt reduction
in entropy that takes place throughout the process. In fact, were entropy not to decrease, the
system would not exhibit goal-oriented behavior.
We are used to associating entropy increments with information losses, and entropy re-
ductions with information gains. Here I am taking the opposite view: Entropy reductions are
associated with information losses. The two views are not incompatible, they simply refer to
different things. The first case deals with a closed system and information about macroscopic
variables. The second, with an open system and microscopic variables. When a closed macro-
scopic system evolves in the direction that maximizes the entropy of all compatible microscopic
states (the usual case in closed thermodynamical systems), the final macro-state does not allow
us to deduce the initial macro-state, since the mapping between them is non-injective. Were we
to know the detailed final micro-state, however, we would be able to deduce the initial micro-
state. When a goal-oriented system evolves in the direction of decreasing entropy, the final
micro-state does not allow us to deduce the initial micro-state, but for a different reason: goal-
oriented systems are open, and they interact with degrees of freedom we are not keeping track
of. In this essay, the distinction between micro and macro-states is not emphasized, because the
phenomena we deal with are not always divisible into separate scales.
The notion of goal-oriented behavior that is used here always brings about an entropy reduc-
tion. I now want to demonstrate the reciprocal statement: If a system reduces its entropy, a goal
can be ascribed to the process. Therefore, entropy reduction and goal-oriented behavior are in a
one-to-one correspondence. The goal in question can always be defined by the restricted set of
values that the variables acquire in the final state: the target DNA sequence, the buried bone, the
ball at the goal. Of course, the reduction in entropy must first be verified: a broad set of initial
states must evolve into a small final set. A car that in a single trial travels from one location to
another is not guaranteed to be a self-driving car. Only if the initial location has proven to be
arbitrary, and the traffic conditions variable, can goal-directed behavior be arrogated.
The notion of entropy is subtle, since it not only characterizes a physical system, but also,
the way it is described. When the universe is described at its utmost basic level (assuming there
is one such level), all we have is a collection of fundamental particles evolving from some initial
state. If the state of all particles is specified, the total entropy of the universe vanishes. Time
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reversibility of the laws of physics dictates entropy to remain zero for all past and future times.
Therefore, there is no way to attain neither an increase nor a reduction in entropy. Energy
dissipation and goal-directed behavior, hence, are absent from the complete description. We
need to blur our point of view to give them a chance, either by restricting the description to
macroscopic variables, or to subsystems. In fact, the main conclusion of this essay is that an
observer with a very special point of view is required for agency to exist.
If the information about the initial conditions is apparently lost in goal-oriented behavior,
then such information must be somehow concealed in degrees of freedom we are not keeping
track of. They may have been moved into too microscopic states to be monitored, or into fluid
degrees of freedom that, by the time the goal is reached, have already exited the subsystem
under study. What we track, and what we ignore, hence, plays a crucial role in agency.
hole
sliding
door
Figure 2: A demon controls the sliding door, al-
lowing particles to pass from right to left, but
not the other way round. The initial state of ev-
ery molecule that the demon has already acted
on (letting it pass or not) is recorded in its mem-
ory, and depicted in blue.
To be consistent with the second law
of thermodynamics, processes where entropy
decreases are only possible in open sys-
tems that somehow interact with the external
world. Originally, they were supposed to re-
quire an energy influx. This is, however, not
a necessary condition: Sometimes, the sole
exchange of information suffices. A good ex-
ample is Maxwell’s Demon [1]. Suppose we
have a gas enclosed in two adjacent chambers
communicated by a small hole in the wall be-
tween them (Fig. 2). The hole may or may
not be covered by a sliding door controlled
by a demon. Initially, both chambers have
equal pressure and density. The demon then
opens or closes the hole selectively, depend-
ing on whether a molecule approaches from
one side, or the other. Molecules coming from the right are allowed to pass into the left cham-
ber, but not the other way round. As time goes by, molecules accumulate on the left side,
eventually leaving the right side empty. The collection of all gas molecules can be interpreted
as performing goal-directed behavior: No matter the initial state, gas is gradually compressed
into the left chamber. This final state can be conceived as a goal, and it comprises a reduction
in entropy: initially each particle can be anywhere in the two chambers, and in the final state,
they are all in the left side. Arrogating purpose, in this case, is to assume that the gas—who
takes the role of the agent—wants to shrink. Other verbs may be used (tends to, is inclined to,
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etc.), but the phrasing is irrelevant. As uncanny as it may seem, arrogating purpose to the gas is
a rather accurate description of the gas’ phenomenology.
The gas+ demon is a toy model of a closed system, so no interaction with the outside world
is allowed. To perform the task, the demon needs to acquire information on the location of each
molecule approaching the hole, to then decide whether to let it pass or not. In a slightly modified
version of this system, Bennett [2] demonstrated that the storage of information in the demon’s
memory can be done with no energy expenditure, as long as the memory is initially blank, and
there is plenty of storage capacity. The work required to move and stop the door, as well as the
energy needed to measure the position of particles and to maintain the demon alive, can also
be made as small as desired, simply diminishing mechanical friction, and moving slowly. The
demon is however not allowed to delete the acquired information, because information erasure
requires energy consumption, at a minimal cost of kBT per erased bit [3]. Therefore, as time
goes by, the information of the initial location of each gas molecule is erased from the gas, and
copied onto the demon’s memory.
The gas gradually reduces its entropy only if we are careful to exclude the demon from what
we define as the system. If we include the demon (and its memory), entropy simply remains
constant, since all the details of the initial state are still stored. Depending on the observer’s
choices, then, entropy may or may not decrease, meaning that arrogating agency may or may
not be possible.
A subsystem can only decrease its entropy if it somehow gets rid of initial conditions. In
DNA replication, after the addition of each new nucleotide to the developing strand, the ini-
tial location of the free nucleotide determines the final configuration of the mediating enzimes,
thereby transferring the information of the initial state to a change in the 3-dimensional configu-
ration of nearby proteins. If enzimes are not restored to their functional state, the process cannot
be iterated. So enzimes, in turn, must pass the information on somewhere else. This transfer is
actually the important point in the emergence of goal-directed behavior. Energy consumption is
only helpful if energy is degraded in the process: ordered energy sources must be transformed
into disordered products. In animal cells, order arrives as glucose and oxygen molecules. Dis-
order exits as carbon dioxide, water and faster molecular motion (heat). The input degrees of
freedom, specifically in the case of glucose, are conformed of atoms tidily organized into large
molecules. The output degrees of freedom are transported by smaller molecules, amenable to
be arranged in many more configurations.
The laws of physics are ultimately reversible, so initial conditions cannot be truly erased,
they can only be shuffled around. As an example, Edward Fredkin studied how non-dissipative
systems, such as our universe, may perform the usual logical computations (AND, OR, etc),
5
which are themselves non-invertible [4]. We know that 0 AND 1 = 0. However, knowing that
the result of the operation is 0 does not suffice to identify the two input variables. If the compu-
tation is performed by an ultimately non-dissipative system, the information of the initial input
variables must be somehow moved into some other variable, albeit perhaps not in a manner that
is easily accessible. Fredkin’s solution was to prove that computing required some extra input
variables, not needed for the computation per se, but mandatory for the information balance.
When performing a single logical operation (say, for example, AND), the additional variables
are in a well defined state (no uncertainty), and throughout the computation, they acquire so-
called garbage values (garbage because they are not required to perform the computation), that
represent those input degrees of freedom that cannot be deduced from the output. Copying
part of the input into garbage variables ensures that no information is lost, and the computation
becomes feasible in a non-dissipative physical substrate.
Input
Output
Figure 3: Goal-directed systems (blue ball) eat
up ordered degrees of freedom, and produce
disordered degrees of freedom.
Ascribing agency is all about ignoring
who really did the job (the Universe, to put
it grandly), and arrogating intentionality to an
entropy-reducing subsystem. The task of the
observer is to design the borders of the sub-
system so as to allow ordered degrees of free-
dom to be progressively incorporated, and/or
disordered ones to be eliminated. If the goal
is to be achieved repeatedly, a steady flow of
order is required, as well as a regular garbage collection service. Purposeful agents, hence,
only emerge from sub systems that eat up order (Fig. 3). Broadly speaking, they can be said
to breathe, or to be endowed with metabolism, even if they need not be alive in the biological
sense.
Maxwell’s demon hid the initial conditions of the gas in its memory. The dog, the self-
driving car, and the soccer players, all hide their own initial state and that of the environment
inside their memories. Memories can of course be erased, but erasures consume energy, and
they are ultimately no more than flushing initial conditions into the high-entropy products of
energy degradation. For a long time, scientists failed to include memories as part of the sys-
tems under study, so goal-directed behavior sometimes appeared paradoxical. Here I argue that
observers attribute agency by disregarding initial conditions. Of course, observers are free to
delineate the borders of the subsystem under study as they wish. They can always shape the
limits of what they define as the agent in such a way as to have it do all sorts of wonderful
things, as achieve goals, and reduce entropy. The agent must be fed with order, and the mess
must be cleaned up, but still, it can be done. The natural question is therefore: What is in-
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teresting in goal-directed behavior if the observer is allowed to engineer the very definition of
the agent, in order to get the desired result? Plants grow because what we define as a plant
is the stuff that grows every spring, and not the dirt left on the ground every autumn. Species
improve because we restrict the definition of a species to the material that a posteriori is seen as
successful, and exclude the corpses left behind of those who failed. Cell division seems to be a
productive business because the waste products are not defined to be part of cells. Returning to
the question posed above “How do the components of the system knowwhat to do, and what not
to do, in order to reach the goal?”, we can now provide an answer. Components know nothing,
observers do. Just as photographers select an arbitrary plane in the visual world where to focus
an image and engender a sharp object (Fig. 4), so do observers choose which variables compose
the system, and which do not, so that a goal emerges.
Figure 4: Observers, just as photographers, se-
lectively focus on an aspect of reality, to satisfy
their cognitive appetite [6]. Potograph kindly
supplied by Lucı´a Samengo.
Should we be amazed that the world we
live in allows observers to create agents?
Could we not live in a universe where as-
signing agency were downright impossible?
I would be very much surprised if it were so.
The impossibility to define goal-directed be-
havior would mean that no subsystems exist
where entropy decreases. The global entropy
growth that takes place in the whole universe
should develop uniformly and monotonously
all throughout space and time, allowing for no
local oscillations. That would be ordered in-
deed! I do not expect disorder to arise in such
an orderly manner.
Within this picture, all the interesting events seem to take place in the observer’s creative act.
Any local decrement of entropy, no matter how trivial, appears to suffice for an observer to be
able to ascribe agency. We are demanding little of the world, and a lot of the observer. But does
the evolving world not have organizational merits of its own? If we look at the history of events
taking place in our planet, as time goes by, agents seem to become increasingly sophisticated.
Compare the strategy of a replicating DNA molecule in a bacterium with the one of Menelaus
of Sparta to recover Helen of Troy, and thereby, ultimately manage bisexual reproduction. All
the complexity of the bacterium’s strategy is present in Menelaus’, but not the other way round.
Evolution seems to be striving towards what appears to be a runaway escalation of sophistica-
tion and design [5]. Is the development of refined agents something that only depends on the
observer’s creativity, or is it something actually taking place independently of observers?
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Merits are shared, I believe. Observers produce agents. In the absence of agents, no sub-
systems are cut out of the wholeness of the cosmos, and complexity cannot be measured. Once
observers are in play, even if they might have never intended it, it turns out that the computa-
tion they perform is liable to iteration. Agency allocation implies that many equal final states
are produced from many different initial states. The final states are similar to one another, and
similarity is a form of order. Such final states can therefore be used as the ordered degrees
of freedom that a higher-level process may use as fuel. This fuel needs to enter into a noisy
system for higher-level agents to emerge (Fig. 5). Noise is typically instantiated by a changing
environment, often in combination with the occasional mistakes that may have happened in the
lower-level process, as mutations in DNA replication. By iterating the algorithm, profuse RNA
replication in free solutions can be observed to give rise to prokaryote cells, who in turn evolve
into eukaryotes, from which multi-cellular organisms appear, all the way up to the ever growing
branches of the tree of life. In the way, conscious humans, civilization, and artificial intelligence
emerge. As well as a lot of garbage, as environmentalists wisely remind us.
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Figure 5: The goal achieved by low-level agents
can become the ordered fuel of higher-level
agents.
The tree of life develops as a continuous
process, irrespectively of whether observers
interpret it or not. Observers are required to
dissect it into agents, and to evaluate their so-
phistication. As we climb the ladder of evo-
lutionary design, the fuel degrees of freedom
diminish in number, and increase in complex-
ity, the latter defined as the number of bits re-
quired to describe their inner structure. If the
resources at the bottom level are finite, the
process cannot be iterated indefinitely, since
eventually, too few and too complex degrees
of freedom may not be identifiable as multiple instances of one single ordered pattern.
Brain-guided observers are continuously ascribing agency. They do so because the role
of a brain is to model the world around its carrier, so that effective survival strategies can be
implemented. They have evolved to do so. Mental models must capture the regularities of the
world, and discard the noise. Here, noise is defined as the degrees of freedom that are irrelevant
to predicting those features of the environment that affect the observer’s fitness. It would be
a waste of resources, if not impossible, for us to represent in our brains all what happens in
a dog’s brain. Much more efficient is to ascribe agency, and conclude that the dog wants to
bury the bone. We cannot follow the evolution of all the bats that were eaten by owls, we
therefore conclude that the predation of owls sharpens the eco-location capacity of bats. We do
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not care for the details with which self-driving cars are programmed, we just think of them as
goal-directed. We need an economic description, so we assign agency.
Observers do not assign agency to all the entropy-reducing systems they meet. Purpose is
only arrogated to subsystems for which there is no evident source of order, or for sources that
are too costly to represent. The cost of a representation is judged in terms of its contribution
to prediction accuracy. If we only look at the gas controlled by Maxwell’s demon, ignoring the
demon itself, we conclude that the gas wants to shrink. If, however, the demon takes weekends
off, the purposeful model of the gas loses accuracy. A more sophisticated representation dis-
cerning between week days and weekends is needed. Assigning agency may or may not be a
convenient strategy, depending on the trade-off between the economy of the representation and
the prediction errors it induces. Arrogating agency in excess, for example by believing that all
what happens is maneuvered by some obscure intentionality, yields a poor prediction strategy.
Observation is the result of development: Observers learn how to observe, and they do so
within the framework of learning theory [7]. They are first exposed to multiple examples of the
process, that act as the training set. Before learning, the final state can only be predicted from
the initial one if all degrees of freedom are tracked - a representation capacity that observers
typically lack. Making the best use of their resources, observers explore the power set of the
system (the set of all subsets of the system) and search for some entropy-reducing subset from
which an agent and a goal can be defined. They then discard the superfluous degrees of freedom,
thereby compressing information. Yet, if the subsystem does indeed reduce entropy, they are
still able to make predictions. With successful predictions the world begins to makes sense, so
ascribing agency is in a way equivalent to constructing knowledge. In fact, the construction of
knowledge can be argued to be the essence of a mind.
In the last paragraphs, we have been observing observers. In doing so, we have placed our-
selves one step above the hierarchical ladder of observation. We have concluded that purposeful
agents do not exist per se, they are a mental construct of observers. This view may be easily
accepted when regarding the agents (let us call them “zombies”) around us, but is more prob-
lematic when it applies to ourselves. In the end, we experience our own purposes in a most
irrefutable manner. In the present context, a self with purposes is no more than a compressed
representation of an observer. Within a physicalist’s point of view, the observer of the self can-
not be situated in any other place than in the same brain where the self emerges. Whether the
observer coincides with the self, whether it only partially overlaps with it, whether it contains
it, or is contained by it, I do not dare to assert. I conjecture, however, that brains create selves
following the same principles with which they ascribe agency to external factors, the difference
being that the creation of the self involves a vastly larger number of degrees of freedom. Those
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degrees of freedom, moreover, are typically only accessible to the local subsystem. They in-
clude the mental processes of which we have conscious access, encompassing external sensory
input, and the detailed state of our body. The latter has been proposed as the base for emotion,
and the higher-level neural patterns triggered by such a state, the base of feeling [8].
Within the self, the subject and the object of observation seem to coincide, forming a strange
loop. Douglas Hofstadter [9] has suggested that the circular nature of the mind observing itself
is essential to the self. I am not sure, however, whether this recursive hypothesis constitutes an
actual explanation of the self, or simply a way to bind the two loose ends together and worry
no more. It could also be the case that what we perceive as a unitary self is in fact a whole
collection of disperse mental processes, inside which multiple observers coexist, although sep-
arately unaccessible. In the end, consciousness has been equated with complex and indivisible
information processing [10], so accessing subprocesses may not be possible. Dennet however
very strongly argues that if such mental subprocesses can be considered multiple observers [11],
there is no such thing as a hierarchy, and even less, an ultimate observer.
I am afraid I am unable to provide a finished picture of agency when going all the way up to
the self. I hope, however, to have built a sensible image of other less intimate agents. The main
conclusion of this essay is that the interesting part of agency is the observer. Physics does not
make sense, observers make sense of it. Life does not have a meaning, we give it a meaning.
Life may not even be fundamentally different from non-life, it may just be a collection of
subsystems that appear to have goals. Goal-directed behavior does not exist if we do not define
our variables in such a way as to bring goals into existence. Bringing goals into existence is a
task that brains perform naturally, because they have evolved to model and predict the future.
One fundamental agent that has emerged inside each one of us is the self. The mechanisms
behind this process remain unclear, but its evolutionary utility is undisputed. Were we not able
to produce meaning, we would not manage to distinguish ourselves as a special part of the
cosmos. We would not have a sense of identity, a sense of self-preservation, nor the ability to
think. The self is required to enunciate even the most basic statements, all the way up from
cogito ergo sum.
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